Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and R&D Subsidy Policy

We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the subsequent oligopoly game. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms in order to raise their bargaining position in the joint venture. This holds true regardless of whether governments offer either unconditional or conditional subsidies. This suggests an alternative explanation of the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies

Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates

We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of preparing a bid in whole or in part. We find that a reimbursement policy is profitable for the procurer only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Moreover, negative rebates (entry fees) always dominate positive rebates

Research Joint Ventures, Licensing, and Industrial Policy

This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the export oligopoly game. Nevertheless, national governments are driven to subsidize their own national firms in order to increase their strength in the joint venture bargaining game. Therefore, our analysis suggests an alternative explanation of the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies

New transformation of Wigner operator in phase space quantum mechanics for the two-mode entangled case

As a natural extension of Fan's paper (arXiv: 0903.1769vl [quant-ph]) by employing the formula of operators' Weyl ordering expansion and the bipartite entangled state representation we find new two-fold complex integration transformation about the Wigner operator (in its entangled form) in phase space quantum mechanics and its inverse transformation. In this way, some operator ordering problems can be solved and the contents of phase space quantum mechanics can be enriched.Comment: 8 pages, 0 figure

Rheo-diecasting AZ91D magnesium alloy

Magnesium recycling has become more important in today’s environmentally aware society. To prompt the usage of recycled magnesium scrap and further improve casting structure and properties, a novel physical approach, the rheo-diecasting process (RDC), has been applied in the present study to deal with AZ91D Mg-alloy directly from die-casting scrap. The experimental results show that the RDC process can be used to produce recycled AZ91D alloy with fine and uniform microstructure and a very low level of porosity. The intermetallic compounds containing the impurity elements were of fine and of spherical morphology, distributed uniformly in the alloy matrix. No oxide particle clusters or oxide films were found in the RDC microstructure. The tensile properties of the recycled AZ91D alloy were comparable to those produced by RDC from the primary alloy ingots., and much better than those produced by conventional High Pressure Die Casting (HPDC)

Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and R&D Subsidy Policy

We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the subsequent oligopoly game. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms in order to raise their bargaining position in the joint venture. This holds true regardless of whether governments offer either unconditional or conditional subsidies. This suggests an alternative explanation of the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies.patent licensing; industrial organization; R&D subsidies; research joint ventures; technology policy